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THE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF AN OLD TOOL
TO COMBAT PREDATORY LENDING
IN NEW MEXICO
Adriel D. Orozco*

“The language of the [Unfair Practices Act] evinces a legislative
recognition that, under certain conditions, the market is truly not
free, leaving it for the courts . . . to stop and preclude those who
prey on the desperation of others from being rewarded with
windfall profits.”1
Justice Edward Chavez
I. INTRODUCTION
States across the country are struggling to reign in the exploitative practices
of predatory lenders.2 In 2007, the New Mexico Legislature adopted changes to the
Small Loan Act of 1955, which limited the interest rates that small lenders could
charge for payday loans.3 Savvy business owners, however, easily curtailed this law
by simply providing loans outside of the payday loan definition.4 Despite a growing
movement across the country and within the state to prevent the high costs of these
loans,5 the New Mexico Legislature has not capped the interest rates that other small
loan lenders can charge their customers.6
State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc.7 (B & B) evinces an
interest by New Mexico courts to use the judiciary to curtail predatory lending

* University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. expected May 2016.
1. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 34, 329 P. 3d 658.
2. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 654–55 (2012) (explaining generally the hardships
faced by consumers and state legislatures’ difficulty in addressing predatory lending). Predatory lending
encompasses a host of “onerous lending practices, which are targeted at vulnerable populations and often
result in devastating losses [to the borrowers]”; KATHLEEN C. ENGLE & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, A FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 156–57 (2012) (indicating that
examples of “predatory” practices or loan terms are: loans that result in no net benefit to the borrower,
loan terms designed to earn supranormal profits, loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, loans
involving other misleading nondisclosures that are nevertheless legal).
3. See Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal Usury
Cap, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 260, 274 (2014) (discussing the passage of the Payday Loan Reform Act). See
also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-32 to -39 (2007).
4. Martin, supra note 3, at 274–75.
5. See Mike Bush, New Mexico Urged to Limit ‘Payday’ Loan Rates, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 28,
2014, http://www.abqjournal.com/502692/news/nm-urged-to-limit-payday-loan-rates.html.
6. Id.
7. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, 329 P. 3d 658.
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against consumers.8 In an effort to limit the excessive interest rates that small lenders
charge low-income New Mexicans, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
quadruple-digit interest rates are against the state’s public policy and invalidated
their use.9 This note argues that the B & B decision exemplifies an expansion of the
unconscionability doctrine because the court dispensed with its traditional case-bycase application and held that, regardless of individual borrower circumstances,
certain interest rates are unconscionable as a matter of law.10 It also argues that the
Legislature, through a patchwork of statutes, particularly through the Unfair
Practices Act11 that empowers the Attorney General to bring cases of unfair trade
practices on behalf of the public,12 laid the groundwork for courts to use the
unconscionability doctrine to police such excessive interest rates. Nevertheless, the
New Mexico Supreme Court missed the mark in B & B by not providing a strong
framework for lower courts to determine whether loans with below-quadruple-digit
interest rates are unconscionable.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Cash Loans Now, operated by B & B Investment Group, Inc., an Illinoisbased company, started to provide payday loans in New Mexico in 2001.13 New
Mexico, at the time, did not regulate payday loans14 nor did Illinois.15 In 2005, the
Illinois Legislature passed the Payday Loan Reform Act to cap finance charges on
payday loans.16 Even though New Mexico did not amend its laws until 2007 to
include similar provisions, 17 in January 2006, B & B, following the trend of many
other payday lenders faced with such regulation, converted its payday loans to

8. In fact, other state courts have pending cases with similar questions faced by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in B & B. In California, a court certified a class for a class action lawsuit against a
consumer lender CashCall, which provided small online loans at high-interest rates of 90% or more, which
were three to four times the actual amount borrowed. See O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc., No. C 08-03174
MEJ, 2009 WL 1833990, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011). In Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
is being asked to review whether the absence of a state-wide interest rate cap can be held unconscionable
as a matter of law. See Williams v. Valued Services of Wisconsin, LLC, No. 2012AP2115, 2013 WL
4016941, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8) cert. granted, 842 N.W.2d 363 (2013); see also Payday Loan Stores
of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Mount, No. 2010AP2298, 2011 WL 2577365, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 30), cert.
granted, 804 N.W.2d 82 (2011), cert. denied, 804 N.W.2d 717 (2012) (previous case certified to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding the unconscionability of excessive interest rates).
9. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 52.
10. Id.
11. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -16 (2003).
12. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 4.
14. Id.
15. Id. ¶ 5; see DEPT. OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIV. OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, ILLINOIS PAYDAY LOAN REFORM ACT THREE YEAR REPORT 3 (2009),
https://www.idfpr.com/dfi/ccd/3YearPLRAReportDFI.pdf.
16. ILLINOIS PAYDAY LOAN REFORM ACT THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 15; see B & B, 2014
NMSC-024, ¶ 5.
17. Martin, supra note 3, at 274.
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installment signature loans in both Illinois and in New Mexico.18 These were small
unsecured loans ranging from $50 to $300 with a term of 12 months.19
On December 2, 2008, Oscar Wellito walked into Cash Loans Now in
Farmington, New Mexico.20 Wellito lived paycheck to paycheck and needed money
to buy gas and feed his children.21 He went to Cash Loans Now because its
advertisements made the process for obtaining a loan and paying it off “look so
easy.”22 With just a signature, he obtained a 12-month signature loan for $100.23 The
loan called for twenty-six bi-weekly installments of $40.16, with a final “balloon”
payment of $55.34.24 At the end of the term, Wellito was expected to pay $999.71 in
interest, which represented a 1,147.14% effective annual percentage rate (APR).25
After making four payments, which totaled $160.64, Wellito had only paid down
$0.02 on the principal amount.26 At that time, he informed Cash Loans Now that he
was unable to continue paying the loan and he was told that due to an accelerationupon-default provision,27 he had to pay the loan off in full or he would have to face
collections.28 Wellito then filed a complaint with the Office of the Attorney General’s
Consumer Protection Division.29
On June 18, 2009, the New Mexico Attorney General, representing the State
of New Mexico under the Unfair Practices Act (UPA),30 filed a complaint against
B & B in the First Judicial District Court.31 On November 20, 2009, the Attorney
General amended its complaint to include American Cash Loans, LLC, another small

18. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 5. See Martin, supra note 3, at 275–76.
19. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 3, 5. (Cash Loans Now offered three types of loans: silver, gold and
platinum with each carrying an annual interest rate of 1,500 %, 1,300 % and 1,147.14 %, respectively).
See Brief in Chief of Appellant at 6, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.
34,266).
20. First Amended Complaint for Violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, for Restitution
and Civil Penalties, and for Declaratory, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 4, State ex rel.
King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010-CV-2009-01916 (1st Dist. N.M. Nov. 20, 2009) (hereinafter cited
as First Amended Complaint).
21. Decision at 1, 2, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010-CV-2009-01916 (1st Dist.
N.M. Dec. 03, 2010) (hereinafter District Court Decision).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1.
24. First Amended Complaint, supra note 20, 4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 7.
30. The Attorney General is authorized to bring an action in the name of the state under N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-12-8(A) (1978) if he has “reasonable belief” that a person is “us[ing] any method, act or
practice which is declared by the Unfair Practices Act to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in
the public interest.” The Attorney General is also empowered by his statutory authority under N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-5-2(B), (J) (1978).
31. See generally Complaint for Violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, for Restitution
and Civil Penalties, and for Declaratory, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 4, State ex rel.
King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010-CV-2009-01916) (1 Dist. N.M. June 18, 2009) (hereinafter cited
as Complaint).
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loan lender with offices in Farmington, Albuquerque, and Hobbs.32 In its complaint,
the State alleged that the signature loans provided by the defendants were
unconscionable under the common law and were also statutorily unconscionable
under the UPA.33 First, it alleged that the interest rate of 1,147.14% was “grossly
unfair and contrary to New Mexico public policy” and thus substantively
unconscionable.34 Further, the State alleged that because the contract was offered on
a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis, the defendants relied on their “superior bargaining
power” to “impose an oppressive and unconscionable rate of interest” on their
borrowers making the contracts procedurally unconscionable.35 Similarly, the State
claimed that the loans were “unconscionable trade practices” under the UPA because
the defendants took “advantage” of the borrowers to a “grossly unfair degree” and
provided a product with a “gross disparity between the value received by a person
and the price paid.”36 In particular, the State presented evidence that the defendants
misled borrowers about the costs of the loans and in the marketing of their products,
aggressively pursued borrowers to renew their debt, and hid costs.37
Since 2006, the defendants had issued 3,822 signature loans.38 The State
asked the district court to enter a permanent injunction by preventing B & B from
making “any loans that share[d] the same or similar terms” and to require the
company to “pay restitution to all consumers determined . . . to have been injured by
[B & B].”39 Allowing the latter would have placed the defendant’s out of business—
a goal the State openly adopted.40
At trial, the State presented the testimony of two other individuals who had
borrowed from the defendants. First, it presented Henrietta Charley, a medical
assistant who struggled financially to provide for her three children.41 She earned
$10.71 per hour working thirty-two hours per week.42 In total, she earned about $615
every two weeks to pay for her monthly expenses, which exceeded $1,000.43 Charley
said she took out a $200 signature loan because she needed money for groceries and
gas.44 Including the finance charges, her total for the one-year loan was $2,360.04.45
The second witness was Rose Atcitty who also faced a tough financial
situation. As a Navajo bilingual educator, Atcitty was making only $800 to $900 per
32. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 1–4. The complaint alleged that American Cash
Loans had the same principle, the same policies and procedures, and offered loan products similar to Cash
Loans Now.
33. Id. at 7–9.
34. Id. at 7–8.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2(E)(1)-(3) (2009).
37. District Court Decision, supra note 21, at 18.
38. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 38, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.
34,266).
39. Id. at 10–12.
40. Brief in Chief of Appellant at 42, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.
34,266) (“There is nothing remotely inequitable about putting [the] Defendants out of business.”).
41. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 8, 329 P. 3d 658.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. District Court Decision, supra note 21, at 2.
45. Id.
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month.46 Because of summer recess, she was laid off that July.47 In addition to having
to care for herself, she also took care of her two children and many grandchildren.48
Atcitty had a bad credit history and took out a loan because she needed money and
thought that it would improve her credit.49
The defendants argued that because their customers knew the loans’
contractual terms and not all of them were in such financial distress as the State’s
witnesses, their loan products or practices were not contrary to New Mexico law or
its public policy.50 To support this proposition, the defendants presented two other
borrowers who were able to pay off their loans.51 Through expert testimony, they
also claimed that because the New Mexico Legislature had not capped the interest
rates for installment signature loans, they could legally charge up to a million percent
interest rates.52 Furthermore, the defendants asserted that even if the borrowers had
financial problems, because the loans provided essentials like buying food for their
children and gas, or paying for their cellphone, the value received was higher than
the amount paid and thus did not present a gross disparity between price and value
under the UPA.53
Ultimately, the district court declined to find the high-interest loans
substantively unconscionable.54 It agreed with the defendants that it could not find
the high interest rates unconscionable as a matter of law because it believed that
doing so would “deprive a class of consumers a choice” of obtaining such loans and
that the legislature was the proper forum to determine when those individuals were
“making a poor choice.”55 Nevertheless, the district court agreed with the State that
the defendants had engaged in procedurally unconscionable practices under the
common law and Section 57-12-2(E)(1).56 The court enjoined these practices in the
future.57
The State appealed and the defendants cross-appealed to the New Mexico
Court of Appeals.58 On July 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals certified the question to
the New Mexico Supreme Court.59 The Supreme Court approved certification and
decided the case on June 26, 2014.60

46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Appellees’ Answer Brief, at 14–16, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp, 2014-NMSC-024 (No.,
34,266).
51. Id. at 14.
52. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 37, 329 P. 3d 658.
53. Id. ¶ 34.
54. Id. ¶¶ 37–45.
55. District Court Decision, supra note 21, at 13.
56. Id. at 20.
57. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 28.
58. Certification to Supreme Court at 2, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.
34,266).
59. Id.
60. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 11.
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III. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE
A.

The Unconscionability Doctrine

The unconscionability doctrine has deep roots in the English common law
and was developed primarily through the courts of equity.61 The doctrine was meant
to police against contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”62
As an equitable doctrine, contractual unconscionability developed to “fill the gaps”
when litigants were unable to “accommodate [the] technical elements” of traditional
contract doctrines such as fraud, duress, and mutual mistake.63 Courts of law,
however, seldom used the concept of unconscionability to find a contract
unenforceable and would rather “resort[] to imaginative flanking devices to defeat
the offending contract.”64 This lead to “strained interpretations” and “highly
unreliable and unpredictable” approaches.65
In the early twentieth century, a culmination of movements led to the
creation of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),66 a uniform act meant to
harmonize the laws of sales and other transactions among the states.67 The U.C.C.’s
chief reporter and draftsman, Karl Llewellyn,68 was concerned with the increased use
of boilerplate commercial contracts and sought to include a version of the
unconscionability doctrine to prevent businesses from “automatically asserting all
conceivable rights in all transactions.”69 In 1957, the U.C.C. codified the
unconscionability doctrine in Section 2-302.70 The official comment stated that
“[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
61. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, 380 (rev. ed. 1993).
62. Paul Bennett Marrow, Contractual Unconscionability: Identifying and Understanding Its
Potential Elements, COLUM. U. Feb. 2000, at 18, http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271/
files/teaching/unconsc.pdf.
63. Id.
64. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §29.2, 380 (rev. ed. 1993).
65. Id. at §29.2, 380-81. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 931, 934 (1969).
66. As part of a movement to “simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions,” Karl Llewelyn aimed to make commercial law more consistent across the country in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 628 (1975) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1962)).
67. See Danzig, supra note 66, at 622.
68. Spanogle, Jr., supra note 65, at 939 n.28.
69. Spanogle, Jr. supra note 65, at 941 (emphasis in original).
70. See Note, Unconscionability Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-302,
45 VA. L. REV. 583, 584–85 n.8 (1959) (citing U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment (May, 1949 draft)).
U.C.C. § 2-302 reads as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
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the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so onesided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.”71 Courts were to focus on the “prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise and not of the disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.”72
Section 2-302 provided a statutory vehicle to the courts “to police explicitly
against the contract clauses which they find to be unconscionable.” 73 Some thought
that by “[a]llowing the courts to pass directly on unconscionability,” Section 2-302
would “permit the development of precedents which lawyers [could] rely upon in
determining what might or might not be considered unconscionable.”74 Courts have
traditionally provided a two-part test for unconscionability by distinguishing the
procedural, related to the circumstances surrounding the loan formation, from the
substantive, which is principally concerned with the one-sidedness of the contractual
terms.75 Some courts require that both be present, however in New Mexico, courts
only require one or the other.76
Because unconscionability was “abstract” in nature, it was best thought to
be applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis.77 This “traditional” application of
the doctrine is exemplified in Section 2-302’s requirements that a hearing be
conducted by the court to determine whether unconscionability was present.78 It
states that “the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence” before the court makes a determination on unconscionability.79 In fact,
legal scholars note that “[e]ach case must be judged on its own particular facts.”80
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, almost all of the states adopted Section
2-302, evincing legislative recognition of the need for judicial policing of
unconscionable commercial contracts.81 In 1967, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
71. Bennett Marrow, supra note 62, at 20 (footnote omitted).
72. Id.
73. The Comment goes on further:
In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of
language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly
on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a
conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.
U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
74. See Note, supra note 70, at 588 (1959) (emphasis in original). However, Section 2-302 has also
be highly criticized. Perhaps one of the strongest critics is commercial law professor Arthur Allen Leff
who wrote that “[i]f this section [2-302] makes anything clear it is that reading this section alone makes
nothing clear about the meaning of ‘unconscionable.’” See also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
75. Leff, supra note 74, at 487.
76. See Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 24, 208 P.3d 901 (“[T]here is no
absolute requirement in our law that both [substantive and procedural unconscionability] must be present
to the same degree or that they both be present at all.”)
77. Bennett Marrow, supra note 62, at 18.
78. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
79. Id. See Spanogle, Jr., supra note 65, at 937.
80. Id.
81. Forty-nine States ultimately adopted the Uniform Commercial Code with California and North
Carolina omitting § 2-302. See Martin B. Shulkin, Unconscionability – The Code, the Court, and the
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District of Colombia used Section 2-302 to support its finding that a consumer
contract was unconscionable, despite the statute not having been adopted by the
jurisdiction when the contract at issue was made.82 Noted as one of the first cases to
apply unconscionability in the consumer context, Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture, Co. exemplified a court’s willingness to use its equitable powers to
interpret public policy and hold a contract void as unconscionable.83
In Williams, Walker-Thomas Furniture Company (Walker-Thomas), a
retail furniture store, entered into agreements with two individuals allowing them to
pay in installments for furniture.84 The terms were provided on a printed form
contract and stated that Walker-Thomas would maintain an ownership interest in
each item, which it would relinquish once it received full payment.85 The terms also
provided that the company would maintain a security interest in any furniture
purchased at its store, regardless of when it was bought, until any and all installments
were finalized.86 One of the plaintiffs, Ora Lee Williams, purchased a stereo for
$514.95 and had reduced her balance to $164 before she defaulted.87 Subsequently,
Walker-Thomas attempted to repossess not only the stereo, but all of the items
Williams had purchased for the past four years.88 The trial court questioned WalkerThomas’ “sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings,” but found that it could
not rule against Walker-Thomas because “[a] review of the legislation in the District
of Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in
this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which this court can declare the
contracts in question contrary to public policy.”89
On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s finding that
there was no legislative or judicial framework under which it could refuse to enforce
the contract.90 Particularly important to the Court of Appeals was that, even though
U.C.C.’s Section 2-302 had not been adopted by Congress at the formation of the
Williams agreement, its adoption was “persuasive authority” that Congress approved
of the courts’ ability to find contracts unconscionable.91 Ultimately, the court noted
that Williams lacked a “meaningful choice” because Walker-Thomas had sold her
the $514 stereo set with “full knowledge” that she only received a $218 monthly
stipend used to “feed, clothe, and support both herself and seven children.”92 In
applying the UCC to the consumer contract at issue, the Court of Appeals held that
the ability to develop the common law, particularly its use of the unconscionability
Consumer, 9 B.C. L. Rev, 367, 367 n.2 (1968). New Mexico enacted its U.C.C. unconscionability
provision, § 55-2-302, under 1961 New Mexico Laws, Ch. 96, § 2-302.
82. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965), reversing 198
A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
83. See generally Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor”,
102 GEO. L.J. 1384, 1387 (2014).
84. Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. See Fleming, supra note 83, at 1395.
88. Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
89. Id. at 448.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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doctrine.93 Holding that the clause was unconscionable, the majority remanded the
case.94
The dissent exemplified the tension between allowing the courts to police
such contracts and waiting for the legislative body to pass corrective legislation.
Judge Danaher noted that he was as “unhappy” as the majority with Walker-Thomas’
practices,95 but he believed that the court should wait until Congress considered
“corrective legislation to protect such exploitative contracts.”96 In his view, the
majority had not made an adequate finding that there “had actually been sharp
practice” because it seemed that Williams had “known precisely where she stood.”97
Because he believed that many aspects of public policy were involved, he noted the
“desirability of a cautious approach to any such problem.”98 However, the majority
did not believe it had to wait as Congress had recently passed Section 2-302,
indicating its approval of courts finding unconscionable contracts unenforceable.
B.

States’ Regulation of Consumer Marketplace: State Usury Caps, Small
Loans Acts, and Unfair Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes99

In the early to mid-20th Century, state legislatures aimed to limit high cost
loans with interest rate caps or usury caps. Usury, a statutory creation, is generally
defined as “the charging or receiving of an interest rate in excess of the statutory
maximum.”100 In New Mexico, the usury law established a 12% cap on interest
rates.101 However, due to “a variety of complex historical, macroeconomic, and
cultural reasons, these [caps] increasingly yielded to a new, largely unregulated
credit marketplace.”102 For example, in 1965 every state had a usury limit on

93. Id.
94. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 450.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 450–51.
99. The federal government also passed a several laws meant to curb predatory lending, however,
most were geared toward governing residential mortgages (Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA), 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a; Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (1994)), insured banks (Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-1835a (1994)), federal credit unions (Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (1994)), federal
banks (National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1994)), and other banks associated with the Federal Reserve
System (Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 43 (1994))); Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1994) (adopted in 1968 to standardize the mechanism for
communicating the terms of consumer credit agreement) and Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961 n. 1 (1991) (passed in 1970 to combat organized crime,
prevent corrupt operation of businesses and its resultant impact on interstate commerce, and discourage
racketeering). See Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious
and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1259, 1261–62
(2001).
100. Bruch, supra note 99, at 1259.
101. Brief in Chief of Appellant at 28, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.,
34,266).
102. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Slight of Hand: Salience
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2008).
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consumer loans and none authorized rates above 300%.103 By the late 2000s, seven
states completely deregulated interest rates and at least 35 states allowed lenders to
charge more than 300% on a typical payday loan.104
One of the deregulating forces of the consumer loans industry was the
enforcement problems of the usury caps in the early 1920s.105 High cost lenders,
known commonly as loan sharks, found ways to evade the laws and charged high
prices for loans that “frequently turned into crippling long-term debt.”106 As a means
to incentivize lenders to become regulated, a reformer named Arthur Ham argued
that “the best course for reform would be to raise the old traditional usury limits to a
point where more mainstream financial institutions could profitably lend small
amounts to working-class borrowers.”107 Working with the Russell Sage Foundation,
Ham proposed a model law that was adopted by many states throughout the
twentieth-century.108 These statutes authorized lenders to exceed usury rates and
charge higher interest rates for consumer loans.109 New Mexico passed the Small
Loan Act, its version of Ham’s act, in 1955.110 Coupled with “aggressive
enforcement by courts and state regulators,” mainstream lenders created more
competition under higher rate caps and were able to out compete the loan sharks.111
Another deregulating force against usury caps was inflation. In the late
1970s, inflation caused interest rates to artificially increase.112 As a result, many
states were pressured to eliminate their interest rate caps.113 In 1981, New Mexico
repealed the cap it had on all written contracts.114 The largely and newly deregulated
consumer marketplace led to the proliferation of the high cost loans at issue in B &
B.115
In the mide-1960s and 70s, state legislatures across the country also
attempted to curb predatory, deceptive and unscrupulous business practices against
consumers beyond the small loans industry by adopting Unfair Deceptive Acts and
Practices (“UDAP”) statutes.116 These laws were specifically developed to provide

103. Id. at 1138–39.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1119.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1120.
108. Id.
109. Bruch, supra note 99, at 1260 n. 37 (“The Uniform Small Loan Laws were drafted between 1916
and 1942 to stem the proliferation of loan sharking in the United States. These statutes authorize lenders
to exceed usury rates and charge as much as 36% APR for small consumer loans.”) (internal citation
omitted).
110. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58–15–31 to –39 (1978).
111. Peterson, supra note 116, at 1120.
112. Id. at 1123.
113. Id. at 1138.
114. See 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 263; see also N.M. Laws ch. 44, § 1.
115. See infra Part III.C.
116. Patrick J. Somers, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes as a Mechanism for State
Attorneys General to Use to Combat Predatory Lending, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, Aug. 7, 2008, at 13,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/careerservices/Unfair%20and%20Deceptive%20Acts%20and%20Practices%20Statutes%20as%20a%20Mech
anism%20for%20State%20Attorneys.pdf. UDAP statutes were based on the Uniform Deceptive Trade
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“greater consumer protection by ‘preventing consumer deception and abuse in the
marketplace.’”117 Before their adoption, “neither consumers nor state agencies had
effective tools against fraud and abuse” to protect consumers.118 In fact, most states
did not have a state agency with a mandate to root out consumer fraud and abuse.119
New Mexico’s version, the Unfair Practices Act (UPA), was enacted in
1967.120 It is mirrored off Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act121 and is
enforced by the Attorney General.122 The UPA explicitly prohibits “unconscionable
trade practices,”123 defined, in pertinent part, as:
an act or practice in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan,
or . . . the extension of credit or in the collection of debts that to a
person’s detriment:
(1) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,
experience or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair
degree; or
(2) results in a gross disparity between the value received
by a person and the price paid.124
New Mexico’s UPA statute, unlike other UDAPs, is not limited to goods or
services,125 but specifically applies to the extension of credit and the collection of
Practices Act developed by the American Bar Association and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
developed by the National Conference on Uniform Laws. Id. at 13, n.67.
117. Id. at 13 quoting Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer
Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods
Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 275–76 (2000) (“In the mid-1960s and mid-1970s UDAP statutes
developed as a way to increase the states’ ‘traditional police power arsenal’ and ‘parallel developments in
consumer law at the federal level.”) See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:
A 50-PAGE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5 (Feb. 2009),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
118. Carter, supra 101, at 5.
119. Id.
120. State v. Gurley, 1987-NMCA-063, ¶ 8, 737 P.2d 1180 (“The New Mexico Legislature enacted a
comprehensive Unfair Practices Act, Sections 57-12-1 to -16, in 1967.”)
121. Paul L. Biderman, Consumer Class Actions Under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, 4 N.M.
L. REV. 49, 50 (1973) (referring to Section 5(a)(1)). The UPA is modeled after Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which was enacted in 1938. Id. The legislature allows courts to construe the UPA
in line with the FTC. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 57-12-4 (1967) (“It is the intent of the legislature that in
construing Section 3 of the Unfair Practices Act the courts to the extent possible will be guided by the
interpretations given by the federal trade commission and the federal courts.”)
122. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-15 (1967) (“In order to promote the uniform administration of the
Unfair Practices Act in New Mexico, the attorney general is to be responsible for its enforcement, but he
may in appropriate cases delegate this authority to the district attorneys of the state and when this is done,
the district attorneys shall have every power conferred upon the attorney general by the Unfair Practices
Act.”); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-8(A) (1978) (“Whenever the attorney general has reasonable
belief that any person is using, has used or is about to use any method, act or practice which is declared
by the Unfair Practices Act to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may
bring an action in the name of the state alleging violations of the Unfair Practices Act.”).
123. Gurley, 1987-NMCA-063, ¶ 8. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-3 (1978) (prohibiting
unconscionable trade practices).
124. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(E) (1978).
125. Somers, supra note 100, at 19–20.
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debt in New Mexico.126 Despite prohibiting “grossly unfair” practices or “gross
disparities” in price and value paid, it does not define these terms. Similarly to the
unconscionability doctrine,127 UDAPs have been criticized for being vague.128
However, some believe that this is desirable as these statutes are “meant to be flexible
and broad so that the laws can ‘adapt to unfair and deceptive practices.’”129
C.

The Rise of the Payday Loan

Though there are competing theories on the origins of payday lending,130
the modern industry first emerged in the South in the late 1980s and quickly spread
the following decade.131 This growth, among other deregulatory factors, was partially
attributed to the elimination of interest rate caps.132 By 2002, the industry exploded
“with over twenty-five thousand retail outlets nationwide, more than McDonald’s,
Burger King, Sears, J.C. Penny, and Target stores combined.”133
Payday loans are short-term loans, usually fourteen to thirty days in
duration, for amounts ranging between $300 to $500 that are secured by a
consumer’s post-dated check or debit authorization.134 These loans are usually
accompanied by triple-digit interest rates or higher.135 For example, in 2007 average
annual interest rates for payday loans varied between 390% and 7,300%, with an
average of 500%.136 Another feature of the payday loan is the “rolling over” of debt.
If, after the short term of the loan, the borrower is unable to pay back the loan in its
entirety, the lender can either deposit the check or allow the borrower to rollover or
extend the loan for a new term.137 The importance of the repeat customer has been
shown in several studies, indicating that these customers make up from 46% to 91%
of payday lenders’ clients.138 One report notes that the industry relies on the repeat
customer as loans do not become profitable until customers have borrowed four or

126. Press Release, Gary L. King, Statement of Attorney General King Regarding Adoption of Title
12, Chapter 2, Part 12 NMAC (Collection of Time-Barred Debt), (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://www.dbainternational.org/news/StatementfromNMAGregCollectionofTimeBarredDebts.pdf. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) & (E) (1978).
127. Id.
128. Somers, supra note 100, at 22. See also Kaplan, supra note 67, at 276 (“These UDAP statutes
generally do not attempt to define the contours of this broad authority, but instead provide for meanings
of unfairness and deception that can adapt to future business practices.”).
129. Somers, supra note 100, at 14.
130. Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices
and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 571 (2010) (discussing two theories that situate payday lending as
an outgrowth of loan sharking in the early twentieth century or check cashing businesses).
131. Id. at 572.
132. Scott Andre Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5
N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001).
133. Peterson, supra note 116, at 1111 (citations omitted).
134. Martin, supra note 130, at 564.
135. Id.
136. Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous Prices,
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 207 (2007).
137. Id. at 207.
138. Martin, supra note 130, at 573.
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five times.139 The problem is that “most borrowers do not have the funds to pay off
the original loan,” and get trapped into cycles of debt.140
As a result of these consequences of payday lending, almost every state has
passed a payday loan reform law to protect consumers. In 2005, Illinois, the homestate of B & B Investment Group, Inc., passed its Payday Loan Reform Act.141 In
2007, the New Mexico legislature, after years of debate, amended the New Mexico
Small Loan Act of 1955 to similarly restrict payday lending practices. 142 At that
time, New Mexico was one of only two states that still did not regulate that
industry.143 The payday loan provisions defined these loans as those with terms
lasting at least fourteen but no more than thirty-five days and capped the interest
rates applied against such loans at 390%, prohibited the rolling over of debt, and
required payday lenders to register with the Financial Institutions Division.144
The payday loan provisions, however, were easily circumvented by payday
lenders. A study showed that small loan lenders in New Mexico “quickly switched
to loan products that fell outside the statute, namely longer loans or those not
involving a post-dated check.”145 As a result, even with the 2007 amendments, small
loan lenders are able to charge above the 390% annual interest rate cap that current
law mandates for payday loans.146 Those loans, called installment signature loans,
are the focus of the B & B case.
IV. DECISION
In a unanimous decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed both
the State’s appeal and the defendants’ cross-appeal. The court first noted New
Mexico’s statutory history attempting to curtail payday lending targeted at New
Mexico’s working poor.147 It further noted that the defendants had “converted” their
payday loans to signature loans both in New Mexico and in Illinois after or near these
states’ passage of their payday reforms.148 After discussing the procedural history of
the case, the court then divided its analysis into three principal parts: first, it
139. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: POLICY SOLUTIONS 5 (2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/PewPaydayPolicySolutionsOct
2013pdf.pdf.
140. Huckstep, supra note 136, at 207.
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-32(B) (2007).
142. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-32 to -39 (1978); see Martin, supra note 3, at 274.
143. Timothy E. Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation and Public
Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115, 117 n.17 (2014).
144. Martin, supra note 3, at 275.
145. Id. at 274–75. See Decision and Final Order at 2, State ex rel. King v. Fastbucks Holding Corp.,
No. D-01010-CV-2009-01917 (1st Dist. N.M. Sep. 26, 2012). (hereinafter Fastbucks District Court
Decision) (“After enactment of the 2007 legislative reforms, Defendants fashioned their loans and
business practices so as to circumvent regulation of payday loans. They dramatically increased their use
of installment loan products and decreased the use of payday loans. Given the obvious reversal in the
usage of the two loan products after the legislation was enacted in 2007, this Court rejects as pretextual
Defendants’ justification that they promoted installment loan products over payday loans due to customers
not having checks.”) (on file with author)
146. Martin, supra note 3, at 275.
147. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 4–6, 329 P. 3d 658..
148. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 5.
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addressed procedural unconscionability and UPA Section 57-12-2(E)(1); second, it
addressed substantive unconscionability under both common law and UPA Section
57-12-2(E)(2); and third, it addressed restitution.
A. Procedural Unconscionability and UPA Section 57-12-1(E)(1)
The defendants cross-appealed the district court’s ruling that it had violated
UPA Section 57-12-2(E)(1) and that their loans were procedurally
unconscionable.149 They primarily contended that the State had failed to provide
substantial evidence that they took advantage of the borrowers’ “lack of knowledge,
ability, experience or capacity” to enter into simple interest contracts to a “grossly
unfair degree.”150 The defendants also argued that the State failed to show that each
“individual” borrower had suffered such detriment.151
Addressing their arguments, the court analyzed the evidence provided by
the State, including expert testimony, evidence of the defendants’ daily practices,
and whether this evidence could be applied in the aggregate. Through expert
testimony the State asserted that loan products, like those offered by the defendants,
were targeted primarily toward unbanked and underbanked individuals, meaning that
they did not have bank accounts or that they used such accounts for simple
transactions, like direct deposits.152 This population tended to be less educated, low
income, and were primarily people of color.153 It also exhibited certain behavioral
and cognitive biases that would make borrowers particularly susceptible to accepting
high cost loans, despite their inability to pay the loans back.154
Focusing on New Mexico, the court cited a study by Professor Nathalie
Martin confirming that borrowers of payday and installment loans in New Mexico
exhibited these biases.155 In particular, Professor Martin’s study found that 75
percent of small loan borrowers in New Mexico “could not identify the annual
149. Id. ¶ 11.
150. Id. ¶ 13; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-12-2(E)(1) (2009).
151. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 26.
152. Id. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and
Underbanked Households, Appendices A–G, Table C–1, 2011 Household Banking Status by State at 126,
www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/. In particular, its loans were exclusively issued to those with steady
employment that were unbanked or underbanked. The court noted that unbanked individuals were those
without checking or savings accounts and underbanked individuals were those with a bank account, but
seldom used it. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 16.
153. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 14-15.
154. Id. ¶ 16. The expert claimed that these individuals exhibited behavioral and cognitive biases that
lead them to “make decisions that were contrary to their interests.” Id. For example, these borrowers
would have “unrealistic expectations about their ability to pay these loans,” meaning that they
“overestimate their ability to control future circumstances and underestimate their exposure to risk.” Id.
He further testified that unbanked and underbanked borrowers had intemporal biases, “focus[ing] on
short-term gains, while discounting future losses they might suffer.” Id. Professor Peterson noted other
biases exhibited by this population such as “framing and anchoring effects” that “distort the borrower’s
perception of cost” as well as “information overload,” meaning that when these borrowers “presented with
a technically complex loan agreement, they cease trying to understand the terms at all because they realize
they will not be able to understand all of the pricing features.” Id. Because of these biases, he contended
this demographic would “focus on the promise of quick cash, and fail to make more considered judgments
about the long-term costs of the loan.” Id.
155. Id. ¶ 17.
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percentage rate (APR) of their small-principal, high interest loan at the point of sale,
or mistakenly believed that the interest rate was between one and 100 percent.”156 In
furtherance of this proposition, the court noted that Wellito and Charley’s testimony
were consistent with these findings.157
Having held that the defendants’ consumers lacked the knowledge,
experience, ability or capacity in credit transactions, the court examined whether the
defendants took advantage of these deficits.158 The State had presented evidence that
the defendants misled the borrowers on the costs of the signature loans. For example,
employees were told to tell customers that they would pay between $1.00 and $1.50
per day on every $100 borrowed.159 At trial, the defendants had admitted that this
was a factually inaccurate daily rate.160 The yearly finance charge at that rate would
be $365 to $547.50 but, the court emphasized, “the [d]efendants knew that the actual
finance charge for one year would be at least $1,000.”161 The court held that the
defendants also used misleading marketing tactics by advertising loans at 50 percent
off, “when in fact the only thing that was 50 percent off was the interest on the first
installment payment on the loan.”162
In addition to misleading borrowers on the costs of the loans, the court held
that the defendants “aggressively” encouraged borrowers to stay indebted and
withheld cost information by failing to provide the borrowers amortization
schedules.163 The defendants’ employees were instructed to call borrowers to
encourage them to increase the principal on their loans.164 At least one employee
noted that there was a practice to call customers once they were one payment away
from paying off their loan.165 Furthermore, amortization schedules appeared to be
purposely withheld from customers.166 Particularly troubling was that these
schedules showed that customers paid only interest for extended periods of time.167
For example, Charley’s $200 loan required her to make sixteen bi-weekly payments
of $90.68 to finally pay off the first $1.56 on her principal, an amount that totaled

156. Id.
157. Id. ¶ 18. The court noted that the two of them testified that they thought that, despite their low
incomes, they could pay off their loans, which showed “unrealistic optimism.” Id. Both of these
borrowers, also exhibited intemporal biases because they thought that the repayment of their loans would
be “easy.” Id. At the end of this analysis, the court commented on the limited financial understanding
exhibited by Charley and Wellito and another consumer, Atcitty and concluded that “these were not
sophisticated borrowers, but borrowers who lacked knowledge of basic consumer finance concepts and
had little experience in banking and credit markets.” Id. ¶ 19.
158. Id. ¶ 20.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
164. Id. ¶ 21. The script for these “courtesy” calls instructed the employees to tell customers that
“[r]enewing your loans with us today . . . would put an extra $___ in your pocket which I’m sure would
come in handy with back to school, last minute vacations or anything else the comes up towards the end
of Summer.” Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 22.
167. Id.
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$1,541.56.168 The court held that these were systematic policies and not isolated
incidents in concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendants took
advantage of these borrowers.169
However, Section 57-12-2(E)(1) also required the State to show that the
“[d]efendants’ practices took advantage of borrowers to a grossly unfair degree.”170
The court stated that, under the UPA, it would “consider whether borrowers were
taken advantage of to a grossly unfair degree by looking at practices in the aggregate,
as well as the borrowers’ characteristics.”171 The defendants contended that the State
had to show that each individual borrower had suffered detriment as a result of their
practices.172 However, the court rejected this argument. The court noted that under
Section 57-12-4 of the UPA, it was to interpret the UPA in line with FTC decisions.
It listed three decisions by the FTC for the proposition that the UPA “does not require
a subjective, individualized showing of detriment.”173 The court then relied on the
defendants’ “pattern of conduct” in “leveraging the borrowers’ cognitive and
behavioral weaknesses to [their] advantage, and that the borrowers were clearly
among the most financially distressed people in New Mexico.”174
In addition to their violation of the UPA, the court held that the defendants’
practices were procedurally unconscionable under the common law.175 Under New
Mexico law, procedural unconscionability could be found where there was inequality
in the contract formation.176 Because of the relative unsophistication of the
borrowers, the court held that there had been unequal bargaining strength in the
formation of the loans.177 In particular, the court noted that the boilerplate nature of
the contracts, despite not being automatically unconscionable, also supported such a
holding.178
As a result, the court agreed with the district court’s decision to impose a
permanent injunction, preventing the defendants from engaging is those practices,
was an appropriate remedy.179 In dicta, the court noted that under New Mexico case

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 25, citing Portales Nat’l Bank v. Ribble, 2003-NMCA-093, ¶ 15, 75 P.3d 838.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. citing Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 23, 208 P.3d 901.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
The district court prohibited the defendants from:
(1) targeting borrowers to try to increase the amount of their principal debt obligation
until the borrower’s file had become inactive for at least sixty days;
(2) quoting the cost of signature loans ”in terms of a daily or other nominal amount . . .
or in any other amount than that which is mandated by the federal Truth in Lending
Act,” in advertising materials or during loan origination;
(3) engaging in any practice that focuses the borrower’s attention on the loan’s
installment payment obligation “without also clearly, conspicuously, and fully
disclosing and explaining the cost of the loan if repaid over the course of the full
repayment term”; and
(4) representing that the loans will be in any way “easy” to repay.
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law, the district court could have voided the contract under procedural
unconscionability alone.180 However, refusing to make such a determination, the
court analyzed whether substantive unconscionability was also present.
B.

Substantive Unconscionability and UPA Section 57-12-1(E)(2)

Next, the court assessed whether there was sufficient evidence to overturn
the district court’s finding that the interest rates were not substantively
unconscionable.181 The district court had concluded that it could not make this
determination “absent an express statutory prohibition.”182 The Supreme Court
rejected this conclusion. The court noted its equitable powers at common law that
empowered it to “render unenforceable an agreement that is unreasonably favorable
to one party while precluding a meaningful choice of the other party.”183 Citing
Cordova the test for substantive unconscionability was to “simply ask[] whether the
contract term is grossly unreasonable and against our public policy under the
circumstances.”184 The court explained that the judiciary was not precluded from
holding that a contractual term was against public policy “simply because there is
not a statute that specifically limits contract terms.”185 It cited the landmark Williams
case186 for the proposition that courts may find consumer contracts unconscionable
“in the absence of binding precedent or statutory power.”187 Williams also supported
the notion that the court, based on a public policy alone, could determine whether
the defendants’ actions were allowed in New Mexico.188

Id. ¶ 29. The district court also ordered that the defendants perform the following:
(1) provide all borrowers with a copy of the amortization schedule;
(2) provide information regarding a substantive legal defense and contact information
for the Attorney General’s Office when communicating with a borrower in connection
with debt collection; and
(3) revise employee manuals to reflect these changes.
Id.
180. Id. ¶ 47. The court relied on recent cases to make this proposition. See id. citing Rivera v. Am.
Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 56, 259 P.3d 803; Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009NMSC-021, ¶ 24, 208 P.3d 901.Ultimately, the court determined that substantive unconscionability was
also present, but refused to void the loan contracts. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 47, 49. The court noted
that it declined to do so because it did not want to provide a “windfall” to the borrowers. Id. ¶ 49. However,
this decision was more likely to be taken because, as the State had noted, voiding the contracts would
have affected 3,822 of the defendant’s loans, putting the defendants out of business. See Brief in Chief of
Appellant at 42, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No. 34,266). The court ultimately
applied New Mexico’s default interest rate at 15% despite comparing the defendant’s loans to New
Mexico’s payday loan provisions, which allow a maximum of 390%. B & B., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 50–
51. This presumably was done to further punish the defendants for their actions.
181. Id. ¶ 32.
182. Id. ¶ 31.
183. Id. ¶ 31 citing Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 21.
184. Id.
185. Id. ¶ 33.
186. 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965), reversing 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964). See supra Part
III.A.
187. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 33. See supra Part I.A.
188. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 33.
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In order to determine whether New Mexico’s public policy prohibited the
defendants’ charged interest rates, the court began with the UPA, the statute at
issue.189 Under the UPA, the legislature had empowered courts to adjudicate cases
involving claims of unconscionable trade practices.190 Section 57-12-2(E)(2)
expressly prohibits credit extensions that result in “a gross disparity” between the
value and the price.191 The district court had determined that the signature loans did
not represent a gross disparity.192 It accepted the defendants’ argument that because
borrowers could pay the loans off early and received a value “beyond the face value,”
there was not a gross disparity between the value and the price.193 This theory rested
on the time value of money, meaning that because the borrowers needed money for
essentials like buying food for their children and gas, or paying for their cellphone,
the value received was higher than the amount paid.194
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument. It explained that such
a subjective theory of value meant that the more desperate a person is for money, the
more “value” that person receives from a loan.195 Such a value theory was erroneous
and unworkable because “consumer exploitation would be legal in direct proportion
to the extent of the consumer’s desperation: the poorer the person, the more
acceptable the exploitation.”196 It determined that such a result “cannot be consonant
with the consumer-protective legislative intent behind the UPA. It is not the use to
which the loan is put that makes its value low or high, but the terms of the loan
itself.”197 Instead, the court adopted an objective reading of value.198 Sidestepping an
extensive analysis, the court held that the loan’s contractual terms made it
particularly low value, including a $25 dollar fee if a check bounced or for a
clearinghouse fee, a 5% penalty for late payments, and the “acceleration-upondefault clause” providing that if borrower fell behind on a payment, the full amount
would become due immediately.199
Next, the court assessed whether New Mexico public policy allowed it to
reject such high interest rates.200 The court determined that the loan features, in
combination with the quadruple-digit interest rates, made it an “objectively lowvalue product” regardless of how the borrower used the principal and thus, were
“grossly disproportionate to their price.”201
The defendants claimed that it was not the public policy of the state to
prohibit usurious interest rates because the legislature removed the interest rate cap

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id.
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in 1981.202 This argument relied on the assumption that by removing the interest rate
cap, the Legislature believed that there was no interest rate that would violate public
policy.203 The court quickly rejected this argument by stating that “[p]ublic policy is
not set by a single statute, or the repeal of a single statute” and concluded that courts
determined public policy by looking at “‘other statutes in pari materia under the
presumption that the legislature acted with full knowledge of relevant statutory and
common law . . . [and] did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing
law.’”204
Under this analysis, the court cited several legislative acts, in addition to the
UPA, that supported a policy against such contractual terms for small loans.205 In
particular, it cited to the Small Loan Act,206 which indicated a legislative intent to
regulate small loans.207 It also noted that New Mexico had adopted Section 2-302 of
the U.C.C., which codified the courts’ “broad remedial power to refuse to enforce an
unconscionable contract.”208 New Mexico’s Money, Interest, and Usury Act209
further indicated that the legislature had envisioned a 15% default interest rate for
contracts without express interest rates.210 Lastly, the court noted that in 2007, the
legislature had enacted the payday loan provision reforms to the Small Loan Act to
prevent the conduct that the defendants engaged in.211 Under those provisions, it
estimated that interest rates were capped at about 400%.212 The court emphasized
that though the loan-type offered now by the defendants was no longer governed by
that act, the defendants’ “success at evading application of the Small Loan Act does
not immunize [them] from other laws that prohibit unconscionable loan practices.”213
The court ultimately determined that “contrary to the defendants’ contention that the
repeal of the interest rate cap demonstrates a public policy in favor of unlimited
interest rates, the statutes when viewed as a whole demonstrate a public policy that
is consumer-protective and anti-usurious.”214 The court concluded that “as a matter
of law, [it is contrary to our public policy] for these historical anomalous interest
rates to be charged in our state.”215
Because it made such a determination under the unconscionability clause,
the court had to decide whether to void the entire contract, void a particular clause
or limit the clause’s application.216 As it believed that accepting the State’s position
to void all of the contracts would provide a “windfall” to all borrowers, it struck the
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quadruple-digit interest rate from the contract.217 It then imposed the New Mexico
15% default rate, finding that in Wellito’s case, the defendants would have to return
to him $45.64.218
V. ANALYSIS
This note analyzes whether the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in
State ex. rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc. appropriately applied the
unconscionability doctrine to determine that quadruple-digit interest rates are against
New Mexico’s public policy and thus, cannot be charged in the state. It will argue
that the court’s application of the unconscionability doctrine dispensed with the caseby-case analysis traditionally undertaken in unconscionability cases; however, it also
argues that this expansion is a natural evolution of the unconscionability doctrine in
light of modern statutory frameworks used to curtail oppressive business practices.
The history of the unconscionability doctrine, as an equitable doctrine,
indicates that courts are willing, if even reluctantly, to override a contractual bargain
if it is determined that the contract is unfair or a party lacks a meaningful choice in
entering such a bargain.219 Courts have the authority to apply the unconscionability
doctrine to excessive interest rates.220 Public policy historically has been an
appropriate measure under the unconscionability doctrine to find contracts
unconscionable, even if a legislatively mandated cap is not in place.221 However, the
novelty of B & B is that the Supreme Court applied the doctrine broadly, dispensing
with the traditional case-by-case determination of unfair bargains between the
contracting parties.222
The case-by-case application of the unconscionability doctrine has been
highly criticized. Professor Arthur Allen Leff, a critic of Section 2-302,223
maintained that the judicial review of “the quality of transactions” through the
unconscionability clause posed particular problems because such cases could be
“economically trivial,” dependent on “several doses of ‘the total context of the fact
situation’ and ‘copious examination of the manifestations of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances . . . .’”224 For example, he hypothesized that after the
D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the Williams case, Walker-Thomas, the seller,
could merely evade the decision by thereafter “distinguish[ing] the case” and
continuing to use the clause is some other variation.225 This, Professor Leff argued,

217. Id.
218. Id. ¶ 51.
219. See supra Part III.A.
220. See Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The
Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates under the Unconscionability
Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 736 n.79 (1995)
221. Id.
222. See infra note 238 for discussion of case where a court upheld an Attorney General’s
circumvention of the traditional case-by-case determination.
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 356 (1969).
225. Id., at 354–55. See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of Williams.
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would create “a new case for case-by-case development” to be litigated.226 But,
assuming that such costly litigation could settle the interpretation of that clause in
that particular jurisdiction, “[it did] not mean that [the] seller would necessarily stop
using it. After all, under the common-law tradition [sellers] lose only if the other
party chooses to litigate, and most consumers don’t.”227 This is because borrowers
may be unfamiliar with the court system and may “likely [be] unaware of the doctrine
or their right to challenge unfair contracts.”228 Professor Leff argued that the relative
impact to change widespread unconscionable practices through case-by-case
litigation was minimal.229 He stated that “[o]ne does not cure any serious breakdown
in a theoretical market system by case-by-case sniping . . . .”230 Thus, Professor Leff
advocated for a more drastic approach regardless of the particular parties in the
dispute.231
In B & B, the defendants argued that the courts had to assess the
circumstances surrounding every one of their 3,822 signature loans in order to find
substantive unconscionability.232 The district court struggled with providing an
overall finding against consumers that were not before it.233 For example, it conceded
that “[t]here is, indeed, something that is shocking about these APRs and about the
amount of the charges,” but that it could not find that “as a matter of law for all
borrowers that the interest rate charged or the amount paid back always outweighs
the value received by the borrower.”234 Furthermore, the district court stated the
under UPA Section 57-12-2(E)(2), “the statutorily mandated evaluation can be made
in regard to an individual loan based on the evidence presented as it related to each
transaction. In this case, the Attorney General eschewed such a showing for the vast
bulk of the borrowers. For these reasons the [c]ourt declines to declare either the
interest rates of the repayment terms unconscionable.”235
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the need to analyze each individual
borrower’s circumstances under three theories: First, the district court interpreted the
value of the loans based on a subjective theory, one that logically allowed “consumer
exploitation . . . in direct proportion to the extent of the consumer’s desperation.”236
Alternatively, the court applied an objective standard that, as explained in the next
section, was not clearly articulated. Second, the UPA was modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which did not require it to assess individual
borrower’s detriments.237 Third, it determined that New Mexico has a broad
consumer-protective public policy against quadruple-digit interest rates, and could
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proscribe them under the unconscionability clause.238 The court cited to Williams for
the proposition that, even absent case law or legislation, the judiciary had the
authority to find a contract or clause unconscionable based on public policy
considerations.239 Though Williams supports that conclusion, the court does not cite
a case where a court used the unconscionability doctrine to find interest rates
unconscionable as a matter of law, without the need to assess each individual
borrower’s circumstances.240 In fact, a salient distinction between Williams and B &
B is that the Williams court arrived at its holding in regards to two plaintiffs who had
both suffered questionable practices by Walker-Thomas.241 Both of their particular
circumstances in relation to the offending clause had been presented to the court. In
contrast, here, only Wellito had filed a complaint with the Attorney General’s Office
and only two others of the thousands of other borrowers, Charley and Atcitty were
presented as examples of the types of consumers served.242 The defendants presented
two witnesses who were able to pay off their loans. The Supreme Court, however,
did not mention them in its opinion.
Nevertheless, modern statutory frameworks support the broad application
of the unconscionability doctrine in B & B. Just like Section 2-302 evinced a revival
of the unconscionability doctrine in the mid-twentieth century by the courts in
commercial dealings,243 countless modern statutes clearly support the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s use of the unconscionability doctrine to broadly contest high cost
loans in the consumer market.244 Here, the basis for the court’s expansive
interpretation was based on New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act and the payday
reform laws.245 The B & B court was able to dispense with the case-by-case analysis
of the doctrine by relying on the UPA’s general applicability as a matter of public
238. See supra Part IV.
239. B & B, 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 33, 329 P. 3d 658. See Bender, supra note 220, at 736 (“One potential
argument against applying the unconscionability standard to interest pricing as distinct from other
contracts in that the legislature, by creating exceptions to usury or abolishing usury entirely, made a
statement of public policy in favor of freedom of contract with no fairness controls.”) But see 1 Arthur L.
Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 129 (1993) (“[I]n the absence of a usury statute, a contract that requires
the payment of a very high rate of interest will be enforced, up to the point at which ‘unconscionability’
becomes an operative factor.” (footnote omitted)).
240. A possibly analogous case is Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971). Though not directly
addressing high interest rates, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kugler determined whether a high cost
product sold to consumers violated the Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 642. The defendant there aimed to
limit the lower court’s decision against it to the 24 consumers named in the complaint. Id. However, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had the “authority and status” to seek
“affirmative relief not only for the benefit of specifically named consumers but also for a large number of
unnamed consumers similarly situated who wish to be represented and to benefit by the judgment entered
therein.” Id. at 535. It further noted that “[t]he courts, recognizing the current trends in consumer
protection legislation, have realized that [statutory relief], as well as with utilization of the common law
concepts of fraud and unconscionability, they can assume an active role in strengthening the consumer’s
limited market leverage.” Id.
241. See supra Part III.A. The Williams majority remanded the case so that the circuit court could
determine whether the contracts at issue were unconscionable and later settled the case. See also Fleming,
supra note 83, at 1432 (discussing Williams on remand).
242. See supra Part II.
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. See Bennett Marrow, supra note 62, at 18.
245. See supra Part III.B.
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policy. For example, the defendants claimed that the State had failed to show that
each “individual borrower thought the loan transaction worked at his or her
detriment.”246 The court noted that the legislature, through Section 57-12-4 of the
UPA, indicated that the act was to be construed in line with interpretations given by
the FTC.247 The court cited several FTC cases that indicated that the government can
bring an action to deter unfair and deceptive trade practices and obtain restitution for
a large class.248 To hold otherwise, the court cited, would require it to rely on “proof
of subjective reliance by each individual consumers, [which] would thwart the
effective prosecution of large consumer redress actions.”249 Furthermore, the UPA
was passed in order to provide attorneys general a mechanism to stop industry-wide
abuses by businesses.250 Section 57-12-8 provides that the Attorney General may
bring an action against any person when he has “reasonable belief” that that person
is violating the UPA.251 As such, the legislature empowered the Attorney General to
contest any violations of the UPA through the courts.252 This section of the act also
allows the Attorney General to seek a temporary or permanent injunction and
restitution.253
Additionally, the court heavily relied on the payday reform laws of 2007.254
Because the defendants’ loan products were virtually identical to the regulated
payday loans, the court reasonably inferred that they were created to evade these
reforms.255 To come to this conclusion, the court had to ignore the fact that the
defendants began to offer the new loan products the year before the laws were
passed256 and that these loans were wholly unregulated by them.257 However, just as
the Williams court construed the passage of Section 2-302 as a legislative declaration
of support to finding unconscionable contracts unenforceable, even if it was passed
after the loan contract was made, the court in B & B reasoned that the mere passage
of the law indicated that these types of loans were the type that the legislature meant
to regulate.258
Furthermore, the unconscionability doctrine’s origins indicate that B & B’s
expansive application of the doctrine is a natural and necessary evolution. As noted
above, individual contracts were difficult to police when, despite some indication of
unfairness, they would not meet the requirements of other traditional doctrines.259 As
246. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 26, 329 P. 3d 658.
247. Id.
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250. Supra Part III.B.
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Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971), where the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General,
in his official capacity, act on behalf of 24 consumers to bring a suit and, without certifying a class, to
proscribe a lender’s high cost product to other similarly situated individuals. Id. at 535.
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scholars have noted, this also provided room for the doctrine to evolve alongside the
business practices that were meant to be prohibited.260 For example, commenting on
the relatively new use of the unconscionability doctrine to find price disparities
unconscionable, one scholar noted that “[a]n expansion of the doctrine from prior
case law and the Official Comments should not be surprising nor should it be rejected
because it is new.”261 Indeed, Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Section 2-302, left
the unconscionability term undefined—presumably intentionally with this evolution
in mind.262 The B & B decision exemplifies just an evolution.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Despite the New Mexico Supreme Court’s expansive application of the
unconscionability doctrine as applied to small-consumer loan interest rates, it may
not have as far reaching implications in the state as some might have hoped (or others
dreaded). By holding that quadruple-digit interest rates are unconscionable as a
matter of public policy in New Mexico, the most obvious effect of B & B is that small
consumer loans with lower interest rates may be open to attack on similar grounds.
The reason for this is that by ignoring the different names and characteristics of the
loans in question, the court effectively expanded the reach of the payday loan
provisions.263 As a result, a lower court may only need to establish that the loans are
similar enough to the payday loans regulated under the Small Loan Act of 1955 in
order to question their validity.264
Thus, it is likely that courts will take a similar position as the B & B court
in focusing on the particular practices of the lender and terms of the contract rather
than on the loan product’s name. In fact, a recent case also filed by the Attorney
General’s Office, King v. Fastbucks Holding Co.,265 exemplifies this scenario. In that
case, Fastbucks provided installment loans with repayment obligations that were
three to five times the amount owed.266 Fastbucks claimed that the loans were
allowed under New Mexico law as they were not regulated as payday loans under
New Mexico’s Small Loans Act of 1955.267 It noted that installment loans are
explicitly prohibited from payday limitations under New Mexico law.268 Like in B &
B, the loan products offered by Fastbucks, however, had many of the characteristics
of payday loans that were prohibited under the 2007 reform. For example, Fastbucks’
loans had high interest rates, with annual rates of 520% to 650%,269 and locked
consumers into recurring cycles of debt.270 As a remedy, the State argued that the
borrowers should receive the excess money collected beyond the principle, minus
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any fees.271 The district court, however rejected that argument explaining that “the
amount of consumer loss is best represented by the difference in the amounts the
borrowers paid under the installment loan products and the amounts they would have
paid had they taken out payday loans.”272 The Fastbucks court further noted that “[i]t
appears from the Legislature’s 2007 reforms that its concern was with the costs of
loans to consumers, rather than what a lending device is named.”273 In justifying this
reading, the court stated that “it would be difficult for a legislative body to fathom
all the clever permutations of lending devices that might be designed or what names
such devices might be given.”274 The court ultimately held that these loans were
unconscionable and applied the interest rate scheme under the 2007 payday reform
laws.275 As Fastbucks and B & B illustrate, New Mexico courts are willing to focus
on the intentions behind statutes to police high cost loans.
However, it will be difficult, in light of the lack of clear framework provided
in B & B, to determine when an interest rate is excessive to the point of
unconscionability.276 For example, though the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed
specific aspects of the loans at issue to determine that they were low value, this
review does little to guide lower courts on whether loans with some or similar aspects
are also considered low value.277 The closest that the court gets to an applicable value
standard is comparing whether a borrower receives “a small amount of principal”
with “an enormous amount of risk.”278 It appears relatively clear that a lower court
would find that a signature loan, with some or similar characteristics as the B & B
loans, with a 999% interest rate unconscionable—it would be difficult for a
defendant to argue that a percentage point difference is sufficiently dissimilar to the
rates in B & B. It also seems more likely that in such a case a court would be
compelled to allow the remedy provided in B & B and strike out the offending
contractual provision, while applying New Mexico’s default interest rate of 15%.279
Nevertheless, a lender under this scenario could easily argue that it would be against
legislative intent because the payday loan law allows a 390% interest rate. This
argument would be particularly powerful if the loans in question were substantially
similar to those intended to be regulated.280
Furthermore, though the court’s indication that only one, procedural or
substantive unconscionability, need be present to find a clause or contract
unconscionable,281 may be unworkable—at least from a consumer protective
perspective. For example, it was obvious that both, the district court and the Supreme
Court, were reluctant to provide broad relief to the State and the borrowers it
represented, such as finding that all of the loans by B & B were procedurally
271.
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unconscionable. The principal reason for this was that its effect would have proven
to be particularly harsh to the lender as it would have put it of business. It is important
to note that no case in New Mexico history has held a loan provision to be
unconscionable solely on the basis of procedural unconscionability.282 The New
Mexico Supreme Court, thus, failed to provide enough clarity that would have
provided a strong deterrent effect against other types of unconscionable practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Small loan lenders, across the country, and in New Mexico, have
circumvented the legislature to continue to charge the same high interest rates and
practices that were meant to be prevented by piecemeal and inadequate legislation.
In deciding State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc., the New Mexico
Supreme Court accomplished what the legislature had been unable to—curtail
quadruple-digit interest rates for small loans. The court’s use of the
unconscionability doctrine to prohibit excessively high interest rates to all New
Mexicans, not just those whose cases were presented before it, provides an expansion
of the doctrine because it does away with the traditional case-by-case analysis.
The court’s expanded use of the doctrine, however, was also a natural
progression of the unconscionability doctrine. Its deep roots in equity, coupled with
the myriad of statutes passed by the legislature to curb deceptive trade practices and
excessive interest rates, laid the groundwork for courts’ authority to police such
unfair and oppressive practices as the lenders practiced here.
Nevertheless, the B & B decision failed to provide a strong framework for
lower courts to determine whether other high interest loans target at low income New
Mexicans can be invalidated. This is particularly problematic as courts may continue
to uphold triple-digit interest rates because the legislature had evinced an acceptance
of at least rates as high as 390% under the payday loan reform provisions. In order
to protect these New Mexicans, the legislature will have to step up.

282. Appellees’ Answer Brief at 36, State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NMSC-024 (No.,
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